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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT:
THE 1982-1983 TERM
Part I
Paul C. Giannelli
Professor of Law
Case Western Reserve University
The 1982-1983 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court
ended on July 6, 1983. This is the first of two arti·
cles reviewing the major decisions involving
criminal procedure decided this Term. The issue
that most observers thought would be the most
significant one addressed this Term was not decid·
ed. In Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983), the
Court, after requesting argument on the issue,
declined to decide whether the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule embraced a "good faith" exception. Writing for a majority, Justice Rehnquist commented: "We decide today, with apologies to all,
that the issue we framed for the parties was not
presented to the Illinois courts and, accordingly,
do not address it." /d. at 2321. The Court, however,
subsequently granted certiorari in three cases that
raise the good faith exception: Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 32 Grim. L. Rptr. 2157 (Mass. 1982); Colorado v. Quintero, 657 P.2d 948 (Colo. 1983); U.S. v.
Leon (9th Cir. 1983); cert. granted, 33 Grim. L. Rptr.
4093-94 (1983). Thus, it seems all but certain that
the issue will be resolved next Term.
The Court also declined to decide another case
on procedural grounds. In City of Los Angles v.
Lyons, 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983), the respondent filed
suit in federal court alleging that the police had illegally used a "chokehold" which rendered him unconscious and caused damage to his larynx while
he was stopped for a traffic violation. The district
court entered a preliminary injunction against the
use of chokeholds. The Court, in a 5-4 decision,
refused to consider the merits of the claim on the
grounds that the respondent had failed to satisfy
the case or controversy requirements of Article Ill
of the Constitution. According to the majority, the
respondent had not shown a "real and immediate
threat" that he would again be subjected to a
chokehold.

ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy - Beepers
In U.S. v. Knotts, 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983), the Court
addressed the issue of whether the use of a
"beeper" came within the protections of the
Fourth Amendment and was therefore subject to
the warrant and probable cause requirements. In
Knotts the defendants were charged with the unlawful manufacture of controlled substances. After
the police had focused their investigation on the
defendant, a beeper (a small radio transmitter) was
attached to a five-gallon drum of chloroform, a
substance used in the manufacture of illicit drugs.
The beeper enabled the police to track a car, in
which the drum was subsequently loaded, to a
cabin. Based on this and other information, the
police obtained a warrant and discovered a
clandestine drug laboratory in the cabin. The
defendant moved to suppress this evidence on
Fourth Amendment grounds. The Eighth Circuit
ruled in favor of the defendant.
On review, however, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the use of a beeper is neither
a search nor a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. In reaching this result, the
Court cited Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967), as the
controlling precedent. Under Katz and its progeny,
the Fourth Amendment protects only activities in
which a person has a justifiable expectation of
privacy. According to the Court, a "person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another." 103 S. Ct. at
1085. "Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory facilities bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded
them in this case." /d. at 1086.
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This last statement was questioned by Justice
Stevens, who, in a concurring opinion, pointed out
that in Katz the Court reached a different result
when it held that the augmentation of natural
senses through electronic eavesdropping devices
was covered by the Fourth Amendment. /d. at 1089.
The Court left one issue concerning the use of
beepers unresolved. Knotts did not challenge the
legality of the police's conduct in installing the
beeper; it had been installed with the consent of
the manufacturer prior to the time the drum was
purchased by the defendant. In a footnote, the
Court observed: "Respondent does not challenge
the warrantless installation of the beeper in the
container .... We note that while several Courts of
Appeals have approved warrantless installations, ... we have not before and do not now pass
on the issue." /d. at 1084n. * *. Thus, if the police
had entered the defendant's house or garage to install the beeper, the Court would have confronted
a different issue.

while it was in this apartment." /d. Thus, the police
had not intruded upon any legitimate expectation
of privacy.
Justice Brennan, dissenting along with Justice
Marshall, criticized the Court for its novel holding:
"We have, to my knowledge, never held that the
physical opening and examination of a container
in the possession of an individual was anything
other than a 'search.' It might be a permissible
search or an impermissible search, require a warrant or not require a warrant, but it is [in] any event
a 'search.' " /d.
Probable Cause
Although the Court bypassed the opportunity to
rule on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, it did decide an important Fourth
Amendment issue in Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct.
2317 (1983). In Gates the police received an
anonymous letter stating that Lance and Sue
Gates derived their income from illicit drug traffic,
kept drugs in their home, and were about to depart
to Florida for the purpose of obtaining drugs. The
police corroborated a number of the facts set forth
in the letter, including the fact that Lance Gates
left by plane for Florida, met a woman there, and
departed West Palm Beach in a car registered to
him. Based on this information, the police obtained a warrant and searched the Gates' car and
home when they arrived back in illinois. Marijuana
was discovered.
The Court agreed that the letter alone did not
provide probable cause, and thus considered
whether the corroboration produced by the police
investigation amounted to probable cause. In
holding the search invalid, the Illinois Supreme
Court applied the two-pronged test derived from
Spinelli v. U.S., 393 U.S. 410 (1964). Under this test,
an informant's tip must satisfy two independent
requirements. First, the tip must establish the informant's basis of knowledge; and second, the information given the magistrate must establish that
the informant is credible or his information is
reliable. The state court found both prongs deficient; there was no information upon which the
magistrate could determine that the informant was
credible, and the corroboration of innocent details
did not establish that the tip was reliable. Moreover, there was no information showing the basis
of the informant's knowledge.
In upholding the search, the Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Rehnquist, jettisoned the
Spinelli two-pronged test and substituted a "totality of the circumstances" test, under which the
credibility of the informant, the reliability of his
information, and the basis of his knowledge are
merely factors in determining probable cause.
Under this analysis, "a deficiency in one [prong]
may be compensated for, in determining the
overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as
to the other, or by some other indicia of
reliability." ld. at 2329.
The Court offered several reasons for rejecting
Spinelli. According to the Court, that test "has en-

Reasonable Expectations of Privacy - Containers
Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319 (1983), involved the warrantless search of a container which
the defendant had received from Calcutta. When
the container arrived at O'Hare International Airport, a customs inspector found marijuana hidden
in a table packed in the container. The inspector
notified a DEA agent who resealed the container
and, along with another officer, delivered the container to the defendant's apartment. After the container was left with the defendant, one officer kept
the apartment under surveillance while the other
sought a warrant. Before a warrant could be obtained, however, the defendant left his apartment
with the container. He was arrested and taken to a
stationhouse where the container was reopened
without a warrant. Relying on container search
cases, see Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979); U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), the lower
courts had held the search invalid. The Supreme
Court reversed.
The majority's analysis, however, was not based
on a warrant exception. Instead, the Court held
that reopening the container was not a search. According to the Court, "No protected privacy interest remains in contraband in a container once
government officers lawfully have opened that container and identified its contents as illegal." /d. at
3323. The Court recognized that some limitation on
its holding was necessary; at some subsequent
point, a person's expectations of privacy in a
returned container would be justified. Accordingly,
the Court wrote that "absent a substantial likelihood that the contents have been changed, there
is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of a container previously opened under lawful authority." /d. at 3325. Applying this standard,
the Court found that the "unusual size of the container, its specialized purpose, and the relatively
short break in surveillance, combined to make it
substantially unlikely that the respondent removed
the table or placed new items inside the container
2

es. Third, the incriminating nature of the evidence
must be "immediately apparent."
In Texas v. Brown, 103 S. Ct. 1535 (1983), the
Court elaborated on these requirements. Brown's
car was stopped by the police at a routine driver's
license checkpoint. When the officer shined his
flashlight into the car, he observed a green party
balloon in the defendant's hand. Alerted, he
changed position and noticed several small plastic
vials and quantities of white powder in an open
glove compartment. The defendant was then
ordered out of the car and the balloon seized.
The Court upheld the seizure. Applying the plain
view doctrine, the Court found the initial stop
valid, Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), and
that the use of the flashlight to see into the car
and glove compartment was not a search. U.S. v.
Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927). The Court also found that
the seizure was "inadvertent"; the roadblock was
not a pretext. 103 S. Ct. at 1543. More importantly,
the Court explained that the requirement that the
incriminating nature of the evidence be immediately apparent meant that the officer must have had
probable cause that the evidence was associated
with criminal activity. According to the Court, the
officer, based on his experience, had probable
cause to seize the balloon. /d. at 1543.
Justice Stevens, concurring, objected to one
aspect of the Court's opinion, finding that it gave
"inadequate consideration to our cases holding
that a closed container may not be opened with a
warrant, even when the container is in plain view
and the officer has probable cause to believe contraband is concealed within." /d. at 1545.

couraged an excessively technical dissection of informant's tips." /d. at 2330. Moveover, the
"rigorous inquiry into the Spinelli prongs and the
complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our
Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the
fact that many warrants are- quite properly ...
- issued on the basis of nontechnical, commonsense judgments of laymen applying a standard
less demanding than those used in more legal proceedings." /d. at 2330-31. Such technical applications might also encourage the police to "resort to
warrantless searches, with the hope of relying on
consent or some other exception to the warrant
clause that might develop at the time of the
search." /d. at 2331.
The Court summarized the totality of the circumstances test in the following passage:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all
the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying the hearsay information,
there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found in a particular place. And the
duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the
magistrate had a "substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]" that probable cause existed. /d. at 2332.

~)

Although the Court went on to state that mere
conclusory assertions in a affidavit would not
satisfy this test, the opinion provides very little
guidance. For the Court, the corroboration of the
innocent details set forth in the letter as well as
the "range of details" provided was sufficient in
Gates. /d. at 2335.
In a concurring opinion, Justice White joined the
Court's judgment. Significantly, however, he
based his opinion on the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule. According to Justice White,
the Spinelli two-pronged test should not be rejected. Justice Brennan, in an opinion joined by
Justice Marshall, also disagreed with the Court's
abandonment of the Spinelli test because the new
test "provides no assurance that magistrates,
rather than the police, or informants, will make
determinations of probable cause; imposes no
structure on magistrates' probable cause inquiries,
and invites the possibility that intrusions may be
justified on less than reliable information from an
honest or credible person .... " /d. at 2359. Justice
Stevens also dissented, finding that the tip did not
satisfy the probable cause requirements.

Stationhouse Inventory Searches
In Illinois v. LaFayette, 103 S. Ct. 2605 (1983), the
Court addressed the constitutionality of stationhouse inventory searches. The police transported
the defendant to the stationhouse after placing
him under arrest for disturbing the peace. At the
stationhouse he was required to empty his pockets
and turn over a purse-type shoulder bag. Searching
the bag, the police found amphetamine pills.
Although the prosecution argued that the search
could be justified as a delayed search incident to
arrest, the Supreme Court decided the issue on the
basis of an inventory search: "At the stationhouse,
it is entirely proper for police to remove and list or
inventory property found on the person or in the
possession of an arrested person who is to be jailed." /d. at 2609.
As an administrative search, the inventory procedure requires neither a warrant nor probable
cause. According to the Court, such a standardized procedure deters false claims, inhibits theft or
careless handling of articles, removes dangerous
instrumentalities, and assists in identifying the arrestee. The fact that the police could have used
less intrusive means, such as placing the purse in
a secure locker, was not considered significant.
Concurring, Justices Marshall and Brennan
pointed out that the search could not have been
justified as a search incident to arrest because it

Plain View
The Court's most extensive discussion of the
plain view doctrine is found in Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, a
plurality of the Court specified three requirements
for a plain view seizure. First, the initial intrusion
which brings the evidence into plain view must be
~··. lawful. Second, the discovery of the evidence must
'~ be "inadvertent"; that is, the police must not know
in advance that the evidence will be discovered.
This requirement protects against pretext search3

had not been undertaken for the purpose of protecting the officer or preventing the destruction of
evidence. /d. at 2611.

making it a crime to refuse to answer police questions during a Terry encounter .... /d. at 1863.
Stop & Frisk - Drug Courier Profile
The defendant in Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct.
1319 (1983), was stopped at Miami International
Airport by two plain-clothes detectives because he
fit the "drug courier profile." They asked him if he
had a "moment" to speak with them and he
replied, "Yes." Upon request, he gave them his
airline ticket and driver's license, which contained
different names. At this point, the police stated
that he was suspected of transporting narcotics
and requested that he accompany them to a small
room. They subsequently brought in his luggage
and asked to search it. He gave them the keys.
Drugs were discovered in the luggage.
Before the Supreme Court, the state proffered
three arguments in support of the officer's conduct. First, they argued that the entire encounter
was consensual. A plurality of the Court, in an
opinion by Justice White, found this argument
"untenable":
Asking for and examining Royer's ticket and his
driver's license were no doubt permissible in themselves, but when the officers identified themselves as
narcotics agents, told Royer that he was suspected of
transporting narcotics, and asked him to accompany
them to the police room, while retaining his ticket and
driver's license without indicating in any way that he
was free to depart, Royer was effectively seized for
the purposes of the Fourth Amendment: /d. at 1326.
Second, the state argued that even if the defendant had been seized, the seizure was based on a
reasonable articulable suspicion under Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). While conceding that the
early stages of the encounter could be justified
under this theory, the plurality found that by the
time Royer turned over the key to the suitcase, he
was as "a practical matter" under arrest. 103 S. Ct.
at 1327. In support of this conclusion, the plurality
pointed out that the officers had Royer's ticket and
identification, had seized his luggage, had never
informed him that he was free to leave, and had
taken him to a small room where he was alone
with the two officers.
The plurality also concluded that the officer's
conduct was more intrusive than necessary to effectuate an investigative detention under Terry.
There were no safety or security reasons that required the transfer of Royer from the concourse to
the room, and alternative investigative measures,
such as the use of dogs to detect the presence of
controlled substances in the luggage, were not
used. This aspect of the Terry rule was summarized as follows: "[A]n investigative detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is necessary
to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the
investigative methods.employed should be the
least intrusive means reasonably available to verify
or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period
of time." /d. at 1325.
Third, the state argued that the seizure was
based upon probable cause, an argument rejected

Stop & Frisk - Request for Identification
Kolander v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983), involved a challenge to a California penal statute
that required persons who loiter or wander on the
street to provide credible and reliable identification and to account for their presence under circumstances that would justify a stop under Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Failure to provide such
identification is disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor. Edward Lawson was detained or arrested
approximately 15 times pursuant to this statute.
He was prosecuted twice and convicted once.
Lawson filed a civil suit seeking a declaratory
judgment that the statute was unconstitutional; he
also sought injunctive relief and damages.
The Court, in an opinion written by Justice
O'Connor, held the statute unconstitutional under
the void-for-vagueness doctrine. As the Court
pointed out, the statute was not simply a stop-andidentify law. Under the California cases the statute
had been interpreted to require that persons detained provide "credible and reliable" identification that carries a "reasonable assurance" of its
authenticity and provides the "means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified
himself." /d. at 1859.
In examining the statute, the Court set forth the
rationale for the vagueness doctrine. "[T]he voidfor-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal
statute define the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that
does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement." /d. at 1858. It was the second
aspect that doomed the California statute. Neither
the statute nor the state court decisions provided
a "standard for determining what a suspect has to
do in order to satisfy the requirement to provide a
'credible and reliable' identification." /d. at 1859.
Consequently, the decision whether credible and
reliable identification has been produced is entrusted to the unguided discretion of the
policeman on the beat.
Having disposed of the case on this ground, the
Court declined to discuss the other issues raised.
/d. at 1860 n.10. Justice Brennan, in a concurring
opinion, however, concluded that the statute also
violated the Fourth Amendment:
In sum, under the Fourth Amendment, police officers
with reasonable suspicion that an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime may detain that
individual, using some force if necessary, for the purpose of asking investigative questions. They may ask
their questions in a way calculated to obtain an answer. But they may not compel an answer, and they
must allow the person to leave after a reasonably
brief period of time unless the information they have
acquired during the encounter has given them probable cause to justify an arrest.
California cannot abridge this constitutional rule by
4

by the plurality. Justices Powell and Brennan concurred in the plurality opinion; four Justices
dissented.

limitation for a permissible Terry stop, we have
never approved a seizure of the person for the prolonged 90-minute period involved here and cannot
do so on the facts presented by this case." /d. at
2646. The Court also noted that the violation was
exacerbated "by failure of the agents to accurately
inform respondent of the place to which they were
transporting his luggage, of the length of time he
might be dispossessed, and of what arrangements
would be made for return of the luggage if the investigation dispelled the suspicion." /d.

Stop & Frisk - Seizure of Property
Raymond Place aroused the suspicion of narcotics agents before he boarded a plane at Miami
International Airport. After discovering discrepancies in the address and telephone number that he
had provided, the agents notified agents in New
York, who met Place when he deplaned, After he
refused to consent to a search of his bags, the
agents seized them. Place, however, was permitted
to depart. The bags were then taken to a different
airport where they were subjected to a "sniff test"
by a trained narcotics dog. The dog reacted
positively. The entire episode, from the seizure to
the sniff test, took approximately 90 minutes.
Because it was late on a Friday afternoon, the
agents did not apply for a warrant until the following Monday morning, when one was issued by a
magistrate. A search of the bags revealed cocaine.
The Supreme Court addressed the legality of the
agent's conduct in U.S. v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637
(1983).
In an opinion by Justice O'Connor, the Court
held that the initial seizure was valid under the
stop and frisk doctrine of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968). The Court rejected the defendant's argument that Terry applied only in circumstances
where the police's safety was involved. "In sum,
we conclude that when an officer's observations
W lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is
carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of Terry and its progeny would permit the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate
the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided the investigative detention is properly limited
in scope." /d. at 2644.
The Court next considered whether conducting a
"sniff-test" constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that
it did not. The sniff test did not involve opening
the luggage, nor did it involve "an officer's rummaging through the contents of luggage." /d. at
2644. Moreover, although the test does tell the
police something about the contents of the luggage, the information is limited to disclosing the
presence or absence of drugs.
Finally, the Court considered the duration of the
detention. Here, the Court rejected the Government's argument that the seizure of property
should be distinguished from the seizure of the
person because the former is generally less intrusive. According to the Court, "such a seizure
can effectively restrain the person since he is subjected to the possible disruption of his travel plans
in order to remain with his luggage or to arrange
_ for its return." /d. at 2645. Applying the Terry
~ cases, the Court ruled the detention unconstitu,_ tional. The agents had ample time, according to
the Court, to arrange for the dog's presence since
they knew in advance the time of arrival. "Thus,
although we decline to adopt any outside time

,0

Justice Marshall, along with Justice Brennan,
concurred in the judgment but disagreed with
parts of the majority opinion. The difference between Justice Marshall and the majority is significant. According to Justice Marshall, "While Terry
may authorize seizures of personal effects incident
to a lawful seizure of the person, nothing in the
Terry line of cases authorizes the police to seize
personal property, such as luggage, independent
of the seizure of the person." /d. at 2649. In his
view, Terry left unchanged the rule that seizures of
property must be based on probable cause. /d. at
2650. Justice Blackmun also concurred, in an opinion joined by Justice Marshall. In his view, the
sniff-test issue should not have been addressed by
the Court because it had not been raised by the
defendant.
Stop & Frisk - Protective Weapons Search
In Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983), police officers approached the defendant's stopped
car after they had observed it speeding and travelling erratically. After the officers asked for the
car's registration, the defendant began walking
toward the driver's door which was open. When
they observed a hunting knife, the police stopped
and frisked the defendant. Looking for other
weapons, they shone their flashlights into the car.
Observing something protruding from under the
armrest, they entered the car and examined the object more closely. This examination led them to
believe that marijuana was contained in the
package. Long challenged the officer's entry into
the car on the ground that Terry v. Ohio authorized
only a limited pat-down search of a person and not
the search of an area.
On review, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Justice O'Connor, rejected this reading of Terry.
According to the Court, a "search of the passenger
compartment of an automobile, limited to those
areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden,
is permissible if the police officer possesses a
reasonable belief based on 'specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant'
the officers in believeing that the suspect is
dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate
control of weapons." /d. at 3480.
Justice Brennan, along with Justice Marshall,
dissented. In his view, "Nothing in Terry authorized
police officers to search a suspect's car based on
reasonable suspicion." !d. at 3484.
5

INTERROGATIONS

sation ensued, during which the officer suggested
a polygraph examination. The next day, after
Miranda warnings were again read, a polygraph examination was conducted. When the examiner told
Bradshaw that he did not believe Bradshaw was
being truthful, Bradshaw changed his story and ad·
mitted driving the vehicle while intoxicated.
Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality opinion. In
Edwards the Court held that once the right to
counsel has been invoked further questioning
must cease "unless the accused himself initiates
further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." 451 U.S. at 484-85. According to the plurality dpinion, the initiation requirement was intended as "a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an accused in police custody
from being badgered by police officers .... " 103 S.
Ct. at 2834. This requirement, however, was only
the first step in a two-step analysis. Even when thE
defendant initiates the conversation, the prosecution must establish a voluntary waiver of the right
to counsel. Having set forth this two-step analysis,
the plurality found that both steps had been satisfied in the case. Although recognizing that many
comments, such as asking for a drink of water or
requesting to use the telephone, would not satisfy
the "initiation" requirement, the plurality concluded that Bradshaw's statement, albeit ambiguous,
evinced a willingness to discuss the investigation
and that his subsequent conduct constituted a
voluntary waiver of the right to counsel. /d. at 2835
Four dissenting Justices, in an opinion by
Justice Marshall, agreed with the plurality's twostep analysis. In other words, Edwards did
establish a per se rule; in the absence of a
defendant-initiated conversation, a subsequent
statement is inadmissible. The dissenters, however, disagreed with the plurality's application of
the two-step analysis to the facts. In their view,
Bradshaw's question evinced only a desire to find
out where he was being taken and not a desire to
discuss the investigation.
The critical vote in support of the judgment was
cast by Justice Powell, who concurred. He believed that it was not clear that Edwards announced a per se rule. He also left no doubt that,
in his opinion, such a rule was undesirable. Thus,
although the Court was badly divided over the application of Edwards, eight Justices did agree that
the case established a two-step analysis and that
the first step - the initiation requirement - was a
per se requirement.

The defendant in Wyrick v. Fields, 103 S. Ct. 394
(1982), was charged with rape. After arrest, he was
released on his own recognizance and retained
counsel. He requested a polygraph examination
after conferring with counsel. Prior to the examination he signed a written consent form which advised him of his Miranda rights. At the conclusion
of the examination, the examiner told him that
there had been some deceit and asked if he could
explain his answers. At this point, the defendant
admitted having intercourse with the victim but
claimed that the act was consensual. At trial he
moved to suppress his statement. The motion was
denied. The defendant subsequently commenced
habeas proceedings and the Eighth Circuit granted
relief, holding that the examiner had failed to provide warnings prior to the post-test interrogation.
The Supreme Court summarily reversed in a per
curiam opinion. The central issue in the case involved the interpretation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477 (1981), in which the Court had held that
once a defendant had invoked his right to counsel
under Miranda, he may not be interrogated unless
he "initiates further communication, exchanges or
conversations with the police." According to the
Court, by requesting a polygraph examination, the
defendant had "initiated interrogation" and thus
no new warnings were required prior to the posttest interrogation.
Significantly, the Court declined to discuss
whether the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had been violated since that issue had not
been considered by the lower court. Justice Marshall's dissent indicates that he, at least, believed
a substantial Sixth Amendment issue was present.
The Court also relied on Edwards v. Arizona in
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 103 S. Ct. 2830 (1983). During
the course of a vehicular homicide investigation,
Bradshaw was asked to accompany the police to
the stationhouse for questioning. After receiving
Miranda warnings, he denied being the driver of
the car. When the police rejected his story, he
stated that he wanted an attorney and the questioning ceased. He was subsequently transported
to the county jail, at which time he said, "Well,
what is going to happen to me now?" The police
officer responded by informing him that he did not
have to talk and "since you have requested an attorney, you know, it has to be at your own free
will." Bradshaw said he understood and a conver-
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